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This article serves as an introduction to this Special Issue on the 
banning or proscription of terrorist organisations around the world. It 
begins by arguing for greater attention to proscription powers because 
of their contemporary ubiquity, considerable historical lineage, 
implications for political life, and ambiguous effectiveness. Following 
an overview of the Issue’s questions and ambitions, the article 
discusses five themes: key moments of continuity and change within 
proscription regimes around the world; the significance of domestic 
political and legal contexts and institutions; the value of this power in 
countering terrorism and beyond; a range of prominent criticisms of 
proscription, including around civil liberties; and the significance of 
language and other symbolic practices in the justification and 
extension of proscription powers. We conclude by sketching the 
arguments and contributions of the subsequent articles in this Issue. 
 
 




The dramatic increase of academic interest in counter-terrorism powers in the period 
since 11 September 2001, in particular, has been much discussed and well 
documented.i Journals such as this one have been at the forefront of debate on the use, 
effectiveness and consequences of measures as disparate as counter-radicalisation 
initiatives,ii drone strikes,iii extraordinary rendition,iv detention without trialv sustained 
military campaigns, legal instruments, and beyond. Yet, while numerous attempts 
have been made to explore the effectiveness, compatibility and legitimacy of such 
tools,vi the power of proscription or the (black)listing of terrorist organisations – the 
focus of this Special Issue – remains curiously neglected, having attracted 
comparatively little scholarly attention to date. This Issue presents an attempt to 
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address this lacuna, and to offer the first sustained analysis of the workings and 
consequences of diverse proscription regimes around the world.  
 As the articles collected in this Special Issue demonstrate, there are at least 
four reasons why we might find ourselves surprised at the lack of scholarly attention 
afforded to proscription. First, this is a power that is employed extremely widely – 
although, as we shall see, inconsistently – across the globe. Most states in the 
international system, and a number of international governmental organisations 
(IGOs), maintain lists of banned terrorist groups. In the United States, for instance, 
the Secretary of State designates a list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs); a 
list which contains 61 organizations at the time of writing this introduction.vii In the 
United Kingdom, it is the Home Secretary who has the power to proscribe an 
organisation believed to be concerned in terrorism (with Parliament’s consent). 71 
organizations are on this list at the time.viii At the inter-state level, meanwhile the 
European Union, established its own “list of persons, groups and entities involved in 
terrorist acts and subject to restrictive measures” ix  following the events of 11 
September 2001. This list currently hosts 13 persons, and 31 groups and entities. x 
This similarity of instruments, yet diversity of outcomes, raises important strategic 
and political questions to which the articles in this Issue are addressed in relation to 
these lists and others maintained by, inter alia, Australia, Canada, Spain, Turkey, and 
Sri Lanka. 
 A second reason we might be surprised by this neglect relates to this power’s 
considerable historical lineage. As this Issue demonstrates, efforts to ban identified 
terrorist groups are by no means limited to post-9/11 counter-terrorism paradigms. 
Indeed, the outlawing of organisations deemed threatening to national security or 
order may be traced back several hundred years across multiple conflicts and 
insurgencies. These include in relation to pre-Christendom Rome, Britain’s anti-
monarchy Yorkistsxi and struggles with Irish Republicanism, ETA in Spain, as well as 
– more recently – Western state actions against groups such as Al Qaida, Boko Haram 
and Islamic State. Several of the articles in this Issue stress the importance of situating 
contemporary proscription regimes within specific national circumstances which pre-
date the so-called ‘war on terror’, making the power an important case for exploring 
the boundaries and evolution of counter-terrorism frameworks that remain too often 
read through a presentist lens. 
 Third, the proscription of terrorist organizations has significant implications 
for political life – and therefore the lives of citizens – within and beyond liberal 
democratic states. Most obviously, legislating against activities such as the 
membership of, support for, or glorification of specific groups risks intruding upon 
liberal democratic freedoms, including in relation to expression, association, and 
speech. xii  Such questions are not unique to proscription; xiii  indeed, metaphorical 
framings of counter-terrorism as requiring some form of balance between liberty and 
security remain pervasive despite academic criticism.xiv These questions are, however, 
particularly acute in this context given that proscription typically serves a preventive 
purpose – at times in combination with other ambitions – which is directed toward 
crimes as yet uncommitted.xv 
 Finally, powers of proscription also, we suggest, merit greater consideration 
given that their relevance and effectiveness in the struggle against terrorism has 
arguably yet to be demonstrated. Already, scholarsxvi have raised concerns that the 
outcomes of counter-terrorism policies and programmes are too rarely, if at all, 
evaluated by governments, although others have suggested that it is possible to do 
precisely this. xvii  And, there are good reasons to question the effectiveness of 
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proscription specifically in attenuating terrorist violence. As several contributors to 
this Issue observe, the banning or sanctioning terrorist groups is often a symbolic 
rather than directly instrumental decision: one that may have policy ends some 
distance from counter-terrorism aspirations. These supplementary ambitions may be 
important, or desirable, or they may not. But they do raise additional questions for 
policy and political evaluation in this context. Indeed, what might be even more 
striking here is that practitioners, too, are often reticent about the functional value of 
proscription, as attested by the former U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James 
R. Clapper who was interviewed for this Issue: 
 
For whatever reason it seemed as though our listing a group had an impact. 
People noticed and the rest of the world cared, but as far as impact on us in 
intelligence; it really didn’t have any.xviii 
 
Proscription in global perspective: questions and themes 
Broadly understood, powers of proscription refer to a series of legal instruments 
which permit a government or other authoritative actor to prohibit the presence of, or 
support for, an identified organisation within its jurisdiction. The act of proscribing an 
organisation in this way, it is often claimed by supporters of such powers, signals 
society’s disavowal of a group’s ideas and actions, at the same time as it suppresses a 
group’s ability to promote or undertake violent extremist activities. Suppression 
typically entails the creation and implementation of a range of criminal offences, 
including criminalising membership of specified groups, prohibiting visible 
manifestations of support for listed groups – such as the wearing of uniforms or the 
display of symbols, and criminalising attempts to solicit or provide financial support 
for such groups (amongst other offences).  
Beyond these specific offences – which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
as we shall see in the articles that follow – proscription also serves a crucial broader 
purpose. That is, the designation of terrorist groups undergirds vast aspects of the 
Western world’s counter-terrorism frameworks. The formal designation of an 
organisation as terrorist, for instance, is a typical pre-requisite to the confiscation or 
freezing of that group’s assets; or the prevention of its members from soliciting 
support; or bans on an organisation running for political office, travelling across 
national borders or using certain forms of transport. Moreover, the listing of 
organisations as terrorist is also key to the lack of significant domestic political 
criticism that follows potentially controversial counter-terrorism actions, such as 
extra-judicial killings overseas. xix  Proscription, in short, is a fulcrum of states’ 
counter-terrorism capabilities and ambitions. 
Yet, because different states adopt their own idiosyncratic approaches to 
defining, enacting and applying proscription regimes, the global edifice of ‘banned 
organisations’ is replete with tensions, incongruences, unintended consequences, 
perverse outcomes, and questionable effectiveness. In the first instance, as noted 
above, there is considerable variance globally around who is, and who is not, 
considered to be ‘terrorist’. This is the case even amongst formally allied countries 
with considerable records of cooperation around counter-terrorism, intelligence, and 
beyond. Where the total number of groups on the US list of Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations currently stands at 61; xx  the UK has designated xxi  71 international 
terrorist organisations, and 14 further organisations in Northern Ireland under 
previous legislation. These figures compare with the 53 ‘listed terrorist entities’ in 
Canada;xxii and the 24 listed terrorist organizations in Australia.xxiii Indeed, only 16 
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groups are proscribed across all four of these countries. For critics, global counter-
money laundering initiatives have been stymied precisely by a failure to adequately 
agree between states which groups do, and do not, fall within national and/or 
international proscription provisions. xxiv  Perhaps of greater concern, however, is 
growing disquiet that some forms of proscription may be counter-productive, 
galvanising support for violent extremist groups in some states.  
In this Issue we offer the first systematic attempt to compare, contrast and 
evaluate the construction and consequences of proscription regimes from a range of 
significant case studies around the world. Taken collectively, the articles in this Issue 
pull attention to five key themes. First, are a series of important historical questions 
around the emergence, continuation and transformation of proscription powers, both 
globally and in relation to specific regimes. What strategic challenges or political 
contexts have given rise to the introduction and extension of these powers to new 
organizations, and – conversely – what explains instances of reluctance to proscribe 
ostensibly worthy candidates? Second, are pressing political questions around the 
impact of proscription upon seemingly established political settlements within liberal 
democratic states, in particular. Here, we delve into the power’s potential for intrusion 
upon freedoms of speech and association, as well as the ability of citizens to engage 
in dissent and various forms of oppositional or symbolic political action. Third, this 
Issue attempts to evaluate the legal situation of national proscription regimes and their 
relationship with international counter-terrorism initiatives, and, indeed, international 
law. Fourth are broadly sociological considerations of the ways in which diasporas 
and minority communities are affected by proscription mechanisms. These include the 
implications for communities who might be linked to overseas struggles against 
oppressive regimes, and, domestically, the ways in which proscription might 
contribute to stigmatisation and the creation of ‘suspect communities’.xxv Finally, the 
Issue also provides analysis of the effectiveness of proscription decisions in achieving 
their intended ambitions of diminishing or disrupting violent extremist activities and 
ideas. 
As the above themes suggests, this discussion will be of interest to a wide, and 
interdisciplinary, audience. The articles collected herein offer a variety of 
methodological, theoretical and disciplinary contributions, spanning literatures found 
within Political Science, International Relations, Public Policy, Law, History, and 
Criminology. In addition, reflecting the unbounded, global implications of domestic 
proscription laws, this issue is very obviously international in its outlook. The articles 
that follow focus on the specific proscription regimes of Australia, Canada, the 
European Union, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, the U.S. and U.K. – at times in 
comparison with other countries. What is more, these are regimes that intersect with 
or impinge on some of the most pressing conflicts or struggles taking place around the 
world today, including those in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Northern Ireland. Yet, 
although an unbounded ‘war on terror’ is implied by the contemporary deployment of 
these powers, we shall see that many of these regimes emanate as much, if not more, 
from the insurgencies and separatist movements of the 20th century.   
 
Continuities and change in proscription regimes 
The proscriptions of antiquity and the middle ages serve to remind us that outlawing 
or banishing enemies of the state is a longstanding privilege of sovereignty. xxvi 
Today’s proscription regimes might be considered crude, though no less severe, 
reflections of these historic antecedents. Despite clear differences – including of 
legitimate authority and military technologies – there are parallels between older 
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declarations of outlawry, authorising the killing an outlawed man without judicial 
oversight or criminal penalty,xxvii and contemporary targeted killings of terror suspects 
by U.S. or U.K. drone strikes over the Middle East or South Asia. In each we see 
identified individuals being excluded from a particular community and the protections 
it offers, whether geographical, normative, or both. 
Notwithstanding such historical continuities, our contributors to this issue 
draw particular attention to the influence of 20th century conflicts on today’s 
proscription regimes. Amongst these cases, the UK stands apart in the breadth of its 
experience of conflict with insurgency or liberation movements in its overseas 
colonial territories. In her exposition of the wavering fortunes of Kurdish separatist 
movements, for instance, Victoria Sentas situates the ‘origins of proscription as a 
mode of warfare against anti-colonial struggles’, especially those of post-war British 
(and French) rule, but also in recent conflicts in Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland.xxviii 
Indeed, Clive Walker observes how the U.K.’s prevailing domestic proscription 
regime emerged within the mires of urban conflict in Northern Ireland. Here Walker 
emphasises how the logics of U.K. counterterrorism policy in that region have long 
sought ‘to stem extreme ideologies by criminalising direct and indirect incitements of 
terrorism’, especially during Margaret Thatcher’s tenure as Prime Minister, with her 
notorious attempt to deprive extremists of ‘the oxygen of publicity’.xxix Yet, presaging 
the violences associated with religious extremism in the new millennium, it was a 
more recent comprehensive review of the UK’s counterterrorism powers by Lord 
Lloyd in 1996 that recognised the growing threat of international terrorism and 
recommended the consolidation of the U.K.’s counterterrorism legislation, resulting 
in the articulation of its current proscription framework in the Terrorism Act 2000.xxx 
 An important point of comparison to the U.K. – given the longevity of its own 
struggle with separatism – is the Spanish proscription regime which has also been 
profoundly shaped by its immediate past. Angela Bourne’s contribution in this issue 
sets out a tension here between the era of dictatorship and Spanish experiences of 
contemporary separatist movements, emphasising Spain’s instinct to pursue a strategy 
of tolerance throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Faced with a complex assortment of 
(violent and non-violent) opposition within the Basque region, and mindful of Spain’s 
recent history of state oppression, political elites in that period elected to pursue a 
strategy of political integration over the exclusion of violent separatist movements. 
The reflex for tolerance was, Bourne explains, a product of Spain’s transition from 
dictatorship to democracy and a concomitant suspicion of excessive state powers. 
This changed, however, in the late 1990s with a judicial decision to broaden the 
conception of ‘terrorist organisation’ to include groups affiliated to terrorist 
organisations such as political parties, trade unions, and workers’ organisations. The 
post-2001 counter-terrorism injunctions of the EU and international community, then, 
operated as a post-hoc ‘external legitimation of illegalisation processes’,xxxi which 
were already well underway on the Iberian Peninsula. 
Across the Atlantic, Canada’s (more limited) exposure to domestic political 
disjuncture proved similarly – if surprisingly – influential in the construction of its 
own proscription regime. An outbreak of Quebecois separatism prompted the 
Canadian government in 1970 to pass the War Measures Act, which declared the 
Front de Liberation du Quebec to be an unlawful association and criminalised its 
membership. The Act led to the imprisonment of hundreds of non-violent Quebec 
separatist sympathisers becoming, thereafter, a ‘moving force’ in Canada’s 
constitutional bill of rights.xxxii This common experience contrasts, of course, with 
Australia which had no meaningful encounter with sustained violent separatism in the 
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twentieth century. This lack of equivalent threats to national security, however, did 
not prevent Australia devising and employing its own regime of exclusion. As 
McGarrity and Williams demonstrate in their contribution, proscription powers were 
prominently, and controversially, deployed to ban the Industrial Workers of the World 
organization in 1913, and – subsequently – the Communist Party in 1950.xxxiii Indeed, 
the latter organisation challenged, unsuccessfully, their ban in a high court challenge 
in 1950.xxxiv Nonetheless, it is telling that during the hearing one of the judges, Justive 
Kitto, expressed his misgivings over the proscription power: ‘You cannot have 
punishment that is preventive. You can’t remove his tongue to stop him speaking 
against you. That is wide open to a totalitarian state.’xxxv  
As with so much of relevance to global counter-terrorism efforts, the attacks 
of 9/11 marked an immediate and pronounced transformation in the status of 
proscription worldwide. xxxvi  In Security Council Resolution 1373, United Nations 
Suppression of Terrorism Regulations, the United Nations enjoined members states to 
institute mechanisms to quell the financing of and support for terrorism.xxxvii The 
legislative response was immediate. The Australian government passed both The 
Charter of the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations 2001xxxviii and 
The Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002xxxix, Canada responded 
with the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001xl, and the United States passed its own Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act).xli The United Kingdom – having 
very recently revised and consolidated its own counter-terrorism powers under the 
considerable Terrorism Act 2000xlii – bolstered these powers further with the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.xliii  
Despite the persistence of concerns about hasty legislating in the field of 
counter-terrorism,xliv it notable that the outcomes of this wave of law-making have 
remained largely intact throughout the intervening years. xlv  In many instances, 
proscription powers have been broadened rather than rolled back, in order to capture 
a wider array of offences – including, for instance, the glorification or advocating of 
terrorism. This appetite for banning, indeed, appears to show few signs of abating, as 
the Australian Attorney-General recently suggested: 
 
I think there is an argument that the threshold for proscribing organisations as 
terrorist organisations is too high at the moment, which is why I’ve instructed the 
preparation of amendments to the Commonwealth Criminal Code, to lower the 
threshold at which organisations can be listed as terrorist organisations.xlvi 
 
Diversity and interplay of proscription regimes 
Another theme brought into focus by contributors to this Issue is the diversity of 
political and legal settings that structure proscription regimes and their complex 
transnational interactions. Here the authors demonstrate the bewildering array of laws 
that work toward the exclusion, sanctioning or criminalisation of specific groups and 
– at times – individuals. The terminology of blacklisting, listing, proscription, 
designation, outlawing, banning orders, and more, are commonplace in the rubric of 
proscription. These are reflective of the often opaque and ambiguous processes and 
powers that constitute these regimes. In part, this is a product of the idiosyncrasies of 
national legal philosophies and traditions, but it also reflects the diversity of political 
interests, definitions of terrorism, and norms pertaining to exclusion, across the case 
studies collected here.  
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For example, McGarrity and Williams’ article introduces readers to 
Australia’s parallel ‘executive’ and ‘judicial’ pathways to proscription.xlvii The former 
relies upon the executive’s near unilateral designation of particular groups as terrorist. 
The latter, in contrast, relies upon a jury’s determination that a particular organisation 
meets the relevant criteria for being considered a terrorist organisation. Canada shares 
these two pathways to listing terrorist entities: xlviii  identification as such by the 
executive, on the one hand, and assessment as meeting the definition of terrorism by a 
court, on the other, typically in the context of a prosecution. Unlike the Australian 
regime, however, Canada does not formally criminalise membership of an 
organisation, only specified activities undertaken in contribution to a listed group’s 
illegal conduct. In contrast to Australia, and other examples such as the UK, put 
otherwise, it is terrorist acts in the Canadian system that are criminalised, not 
membership of terrorist groups. 
Turning to the U.S., there is a remarkable array of legal instruments available 
to sanction designated, or even suspected, terrorist groups. Amongst these, the 
Foreign Terrorist Organisation list is the most prominent – and the subject of 
extended reflection by James Clapper in the interview published here.xlix In addition 
to this, however, there is also the ‘Terrorist Exclusion List’, l  the ‘Specially 
Designated Terrorists’ (SDTs) list; the ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorists’ 
(SDGT) list li ; and, the state-sponsors of terrorism list. lii  Indeed, given this broad 
collection of instruments, it is surprising that one additional list – the Specially 
Designated Narcotics Traffickersliii – has been employed by the U.S. to target Kurdish 
negotiators under the US Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (‘Kingpin 
Act’).liv 
 Crucially, these diverse regimes are not unconnected to one another; they 
frequently intersect in context of ongoing struggles of armed groups beyond the 
domestic jurisdiction. In her examination of efforts to outlaw Kurdish separatism, for 
instance, Sentas underlines the cementing power of overlapping and intersecting 
proscription regimes, arguing: ‘The particular operations and effects of proscription 
are organised through transnational cooperation and the complex interaction of other 
diverse listing regimes’lv. Nadarajah, discussing responses to ongoing conflict in Sri 
Lanka, extends this view, arguing that proscription regimes are cohered by common 
western ‘liberal peace logics’ representing ‘a disciplinary modality of transnational 
security governance’ aimed at the production of a global liberal order.lvi 
 
Consequences of proscription 
In pursuit of domestic and global security, proscription is deployed to effect a range 
of direct and indirect sanctions and penalties. It is not, however, a device of great 
precision. And so it is understood to produce outcomes that might be described as 
unintended or, at least, unanticipated; not least for individuals, political organisations 
and ethnic diasporas which might become snared in proscription sanctions. This also, 
of course, has broader implications for national security, international organisations, 
and fundamental liberal freedoms.    
For individuals connected to designated entities, the consequences can be 
severe. By refusing the temptation to criminalise membership of terrorist 
organisations, Canada adopts a relatively cautious approach, relying upon the 
criminalisation of any conduct undertaken by individuals in association with a ‘listed 
entity’ pursuant to terrorismlvii. Other states, however, are less restrained. Thus, where 
both the Australian and U.K. proscription regimes contain ‘status’ offences relating to 
membership – criminalising individuals for who they are, rather than what they have 
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done – Australia’s powers grant prosecutors considerable latitude, specifying 
‘informal’ members as well those who have ‘taken steps to become a member’. This 
prompts McGarrity and Williams to wonder, “Is, for example, an individual who 
merely attends a meeting of an organisation or subscribes to a magazine of an 
organisation to be regarded as a member…?”.lviii Australia’s powers go even further 
than this, however, with a second status offence of ‘association’, which criminalises 
knowingly associating with a member of a proscribed terrorist organisation on two or 
more occasions with the intention of supporting the organisation.lix Status offences of 
this sort attract much criticism for the latitude they provide to the state’s apparatuses. 
In Turkey, for example, membership offences have been used as a means of 
suppressing domestic dissent and support for Kurdish separatism in which Kurds are, 
as Sentas argues in this issue, ‘routinely’ prosecuted for crimes connected to the PKK 
or membership of the PKK on often spurious evidence. As she notes, the period of 
2009 and 2013 alone saw nearly 40,000 such prosecutions.lx  
This diversity of offences within global proscription regimes is matched by the 
considerable variation that exists in the extent of sanctions that are applied to 
proscribed or listed organisations. At one end of the scale, Canada does not ban 
organisations per se, or membership thereof, and since the October Crisis of 1970, 
Canada has taken pains to avoid such a ‘negative model’ of proscription.lxi In other 
regimes, such as those maintained by the United Kingdom, Australia and the United 
States, the designation of a group as a terrorist organisation entails that property can 
be frozen, and providing financial or other services to a group is criminalized. 
Proscription regimes also give rise to a range of indirect consequences, some of which 
are unintended or, at least, unacknowledged. Amongst our contributors here, for 
example, it is noted that proscription regimes can aggravate attempts at peace and 
reconciliationlxii and ‘codify antagonistic relations between states and sections of their 
societies’.lxiii  
Although these implications are significant, the persistence – indeed, often 
extension – of proscription as a counter-terrorism tool may be taken as testament to 
the continuing view of state representatives that this constitutes an effective 
mechanism for resolving terrorist violence or for satisficing other interests. 
Commonly, we see governments make weak and strong causal claims of proscription; 
the ‘weak’ causal effect of its symbolism for communicating the government and 
society’s disavowal or stigmatisation of designated groups,lxiv and the ‘strong’ causal 
reasoning that holds that proscription’s financial and criminal sanction significantly 
reduces a group’s capacity to commit terrorist acts.lxv 
The U.K. is illustrative of these claims. In his article on the U.K’s 
longstanding use of proscription, both at home and in its colonies abroad, Walker 
identifies five prominent policy claims. First, proscription ‘caters for … the state’s 
concerns about paramilitarism’. Second, proscription serves a pre-emptive function in 
that it works to address underlying terrorist “structures and capabilities rather than 
awaiting the harms from an attack and applying a post hoc response to tangible 
actions.” Third, this is a power which fits with the criminalisation of terrorism and 
serves as a convenient means to prosecute would-be terrorists, “but which in reality 
extends the ambit of the offence of conspiracy since no other specific crime need be 
contemplated”. lxvi  Fourth, proscription has also been argued to serve a symbolic 
function, expressing the state’s disavowal of a group’s politics and/or its methods. 
Finally, citing Lord Bassam, Walker also notes that proscription is often justified by 
the British government as providing an important contribution to ‘our responsibility to 
support other members of the international community in the global fight against 
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terrorism’. This emphasis on the symbolic aspects of proscription is picked up by 
James Clapper in the interview which brings this Issue to a close. In it, Clapper 
affirms the value of the FTO list in terms of its ‘important symbolism, both 
domestically and internationally, to listing terrorist groups’. Though doubtful in 
general of the ‘substantive’ utility of FTO listing, Clapper suggests that the sanctions 
of FTO listing gain traction where groups exhibit ‘nation-state characteristics’.  
This set of reasons underlines the multiple aims that are served by 
proscription. Depending on the context, proscription can be simultaneously 
instrumental, political and symbolic. It can seek to communicate a government’s 
political stance on a conflict; it can bolster global efforts to vanquish common threats; 
it can trigger policing powers targeting a specific group and its supporters; and it can 
augment a government’s diplomatic relationship with other states. Against this array 
of policing and political benefits conferred by proscription, it is unsurprising that 
these powers are privileged and protected by governments worldwide. 
 
Problems of proscription 
Although proscription may have – as we have seen – considerable utility for 
governments in their confrontation with terrorism, these powers have also long 
provoked discomfort amongst commentators and even legislators themselves. In the 
British context, for example, parliamentary debate around the addition of new 
organisations to the proscribed list has seen this power described as ‘severe’ and 
‘heavy’; with fears expressed including the power’s risk of transgressing liberal 
democratic rights and freedoms, as well as its potential to be counter-productive in 
producing or aggravating the very types of violence and organisation it is intended to 
diminish. lxvii  Our contributors in this Issue engage with concerns such as these, 
depicting a range of knotty legal, legislative and causal problems.  
McGarrity & Williams’ survey of the machinations of Australian proscription 
regime identifies many prominent juridical objections to proscription. Though the 
considerable latitude for proscription afforded to the Attorney-General via ‘executive’ 
proscription is preferable, in their view, to a judicial determination of what is, or is 
not, a terrorist organisation, they insist that executive proscription remains 
problematic: it denies the affected group or individual natural justice, and provides 
few meaningful avenues for review of the proscription decision-making, not least for 
the group concerned. They further highlight the frailties of having two processes via 
which proscription can proceed, commenting on how the first – the definition of 
terrorist organisation – is ‘exceptionally broad’, and the second – targeting groups 
concerned in the ‘advocacy’ of terrorism – is framed with such ambiguity as to entail 
a ‘threat to the freedom of expression’. As they highlight, this brings about 
considerable risk of executive abuse of these powers in the absence of meaningful 
checks and balances from elsewhere in the political system. Association offences, 
they further suggest, contribute to perceptions that Muslim communities are unfairly 
targeted within contemporary counter-terrorism initiatives. This may have significant 
additional consequences for national security, for, as they note: “Home-grown 
terrorism is far more likely to emerge from a divided society in which people feel 
marginalised and disempowered on the basis of their race or religious beliefs”. 
 Adding to these concerns, Forcese and Roach point to a similar lack of due 
process within the Canadian system of listed groups and their members. As they point 
out, there is no notice given, or opportunity to challenge faulty intelligence, accorded 
to groups before they are listed under this regime. In addition, the lowered substantive 
standard for listing terrorist organisations leaves the process susceptible to the 
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problem of ‘false positives’. The consequence of such mistakes is not just to cause 
direct harm to innocent individuals or groups, which may be egregious in itself, but 
also to fuel extremist narratives around Western islamophobia, with counter-terrorism 
set as ‘indiscriminately aimed at Muslims rather than violence’.lxviii Adding to such 
issues is Marieke de Goede’s analysis of the processes and consequences of EU 
blacklisting measures, which she contends are frequently based on superficial source 
material, and proceed via an elusive process of decision-making. In consequence, she 
finds, blacklisting entails breaches of human rights.lxix 
 This is some of the cross-section of the concerns with proscription put forward 
by the contributions within this issue. Across the case studies explored, authors voice 
often-shared concerns that proscription decision-making is heavily politicised, 
deleterious to fundamental liberties or rights, and characterised by a generous and, in 
many cases, unilateral remit accorded to the executive. Input into specific proscription 
decisions, moreover, is frequently predicated on untested, unchallenged and 
superficial evidence with only scant legislative scrutiny. Likewise, judicial oversight 
has tended to be narrowed in law and, in any case, only triggered in the unlikely event 
that members of a proscribed organisation have sufficient legal resources and access 
to the courts of the appropriate jurisdiction. 
 
Language and Symbolism 
The above discussion emphasises some of the major political and ethical challenges 
raised by proscription, especially in the context of liberal democratic states. Yet, as 
we have already seen, the banning of specific organisations is frequently a lengthy 
and complex process involving multiple actors and agendas that extends beyond 
decision-making by executive fiat. Angela Bourne’s article in this Issue, for instance, 
focuses on the Spanish experience and encourages us to see proscription as an 
example of securitization: a process by which the threat posed by terrorism – in this 
case Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) – is amplified, or even produced. Drawing on 
recent ‘sociological’ approaches to securitization, lxx  Bourne investigates how the 
Spanish courts in the late 1990s pursued a much broader understanding of ETA as a 
‘complex structure’ of multiple parts than had previously been the case, and how this 
framing was subsequently picked up and augmented in the Spanish mainstream 
media’s efforts to emphasised the threat of ETA and associated groups to the 
democratic community. 
Bourne’s article encourages us to take seriously the importance of language 
and other symbolic practices for counter-terrorism mechanisms such as proscription. 
Proscription – like any other security measure – has to be explained and justified to 
various audiences, if it is to appear as a legitimate, necessary and/or proportionate 
reaction to a particular threat. Crucial within this process – and the focus of Marieke 
de Goede’s contribution to this Issue – are arguments or claims made about 
temporality: about time. De Goede’s article draws on a small but growing literature 
on temporality and counter-terrorism. Authors such as Noonlxxi and Angstromlxxii have 
highlighted the importance of historical metaphors and analogies – from the Crusades 
to Pearl Harbor – in the framing of the contemporary war on terror, while Jarvislxxiii 
and Fisherlxxiv explore the discursive work that is done by arguments about specific 
pasts, presents, and futures in this context. Other work, drawing on sociological and 
related literatures around risk, emphasises the importance of (constructed) future 
scenarios for specific counter-terrorism policies and initiatives. lxxv  De Goede’s 
contribution in this Issue is to demonstrate the significance of arguments around (i) 
‘violent futures’ and (ii) the ostensibly temporary nature of blacklisting practices, for 
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two recent proscription cases that came before the European General Court (formerly 
the European Court of Justice). As she summarises, “As security measure, 
proscription brings the potential, catastrophic, future into the present and renders 
possible a present sanction in advance of terrorist violence”.lxxvi 
 These articles serve to link this special issue – and the issue of proscription – 
to contemporary debates on the symbolic, performative, ritualistic and discursive 
aspects of counter-terrorism practices. In so doing, they demonstrate the purchase of 
recent theoretical advances within fields such as critical security studies for the 
analysis of proscription, and speak to contemporary literatures associated with critical 
terrorism studies, understood in its broadest sense. These articles complement the 
legal, policy, and normative analysis contained elsewhere in this issue, by asking, in 
effect, ‘what needs to be in place for the proscription or listing of specific 
organisations’? Their emphasis on lawmakers and the criminal justice system, 
moreover, speaks to recent debate within this journal and beyondlxxvii on the role of 
‘security professionals’ beyond political executives in counter-terrorism decision-
making.  
 
In this Special Issue 
The Special Issue begins with Nicola McGarrity and George Williams’ analysis of the 
Australian proscription regime. Their article begins with an introduction to the 
legislation underpinning this regime – which incorporates two different pathways to 
the identification of a terrorist organisation – and a discussion of some of the 
deficiencies thereof. These include problems associated with the designation of 
terrorist organisations, and the circumscribed space that exists for the review and 
contestation of specific listing decisions. McGarrity and Williams then turn to the use 
of Australian proscription powers in practice, noting that 23 organisations were listed 
under Division 102 by March 2017, with all but one of which self-identifying as 
Islamic. This leads into an analysis of the various proscription offences and 
prosecutions provided for within the Australian regime, with a particular focus on 
cases involving accusations of membership, funding, and providing support or 
resources for terrorist organisations. 
 The second article in this issue, by Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, turns to the 
Canadian experience of terrorist group listing. As with McGarrity and Williams, 
Forcese and Roach are keen to situate contemporary powers historically. In this case, 
however, subsequent challenges to the 1970 listing of the Front de Liberation du 
Quebec stand as a cautionary note discouraging the banning of organisations. Forcese 
and Roach’s article highlights a potential disconnect in the Canadian example 
between a power which is ‘potent in principle, but….rarely deployed in practice’,lxxviii 
although in so doing, they note the scope that exists for the greater use of this going 
forward. The article concludes by highlighting a number of criticisms that resonate 
with the Australian case, including around issues of due process, problems of false 
positives, and concerns around delisting and the intrusion of political considerations 
upon banning decisions. 
 Clive Walker’s contribution calls particular attention to the role of de-
proscription in counterterrorism frameworks. Drawing predominantly on cases 
relating to the conflict around Northern Ireland, Walker puts forward a potentially 
counter-intuitive argument for deproscription as a fundamental, but overlooked, 
element of counterterrorism policy. He commences by unpicking the effectiveness 
and fairness of UK proscription laws, arguing that neither are reflected well in current 
deproscription processes. There are, therefore, in Walker’s view several compelling 
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grounds to revamp current deproscription powers. These include: to maintain the 
lawfulness of proscription; to assist conflict resolution; and to facilitate restorative 
justice approaches.  Deproscription reform, Walker concludes, requires strengthened 
oversight by the executive, legislature and judiciary if it is to function as an effective 
component of counter-terrorism. 
Suthaharan Nadarajah’s article critiques the means-end instrumentalism of 
proscription’s advocates. Rather, he argues, proscription powers are more 
appropriately understood as constitutive of the west’s vision of a global liberal peace. 
Approaching the conflict in Sri Lanka as the embodiment of that vision, with market 
democracy set against ‘a violent ethno-nationalist separatist threat’, Nadarajah 
considers the oscillations in security postures taken by western states towards the 
LTTE and the Tamil diaspora between 1983 and 2009. Here he finds that proscription 
in this context is ‘inseparable from and conditioned by the everyday calculations 
inherent to wider western efforts towards global stability’. The banning of Tamil 
groups in western states, he continues, is therefore a product of transformations in 
how liberalism and illiberalism are understood and operationalised in security policy.  
Victoria Sentas’ contribution reframes proscription as a mode of post-colonial 
counterinsurgency. Her article considers the globalised proscription of the Kurdistan 
Workers' Party (PKK) and its attendant effects on the broader Kurdish population. 
Her argument unpacks the historical logics and practices of counterinsurgency and 
draws parallels to prevailing international proscriptions, highlighting how both depict 
state/non-state conflicts as a struggle for the consent of the population.  
Angela K. Bourne’s article takes a different approach to the issue of 
proscription in Spain, one which draws upon securitization theory. In it, she explores 
the Spanish state’s widening of the targets of listing in the late 1990s from the Basque 
nationalist Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) to a much a broader collection of associated 
groups including political parties, trade unions and women’s organisations. Her 
analysis begins by exploring court rulings against organisations and parties linked to 
ETA, before exploring the public resonance of this concerted attempt at securitization 
via quantitative and qualitative analysis of the major Spanish daily newspaper, El 
Pais. Doing so, reveals considerable similarity in the increased judicial and media 
appetite to frame ETA as a ‘complex structure’ with multiple parts posing a 
significant threat to the Spanish democratic community. 
 Marieke de Goede’s article offers an analysis of two recent criminal trials 
relating to proscription within the European Union. The first of these concerns the 
(de-)listing of Mr. Kadi before the European Court of Justice that took place in a 
series of cases between 2001 and 2013. The second concerns the placing of the LTTE 
on the European Union blacklist in 2006. These cases, she argues, demonstrate the 
importance of assumptions and arguments about temporalities – including temporary 
presents, and future intentions – as much as considerations relating to due process and 
the human rights of those charged with terrorism-related offences. 
 The Special Issue comes to a close with a focus upon the United States’ 
experience of proscription. Here we attempt to complement the small, but growing, 
academic literature on this particular case study lxxix via a prolonged and anotated 
discussion with James Clapper, the former U.S. Director of National Intelligence. 
This interview explores the issue of proscription from the perspective of those who 
are charged with very real responsibilities regarding national security. In it, Clapper 
reflects on the function of the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list within the 
broader context of U.S. counterterrorism initiatives. He argues that the FTO List was, 
throughout his tenure, shaped by the latent political and diplomatic concerns of the 
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U.S. government and was thus more ‘symbolic’ than ‘substantive’. Elaborating this 
perspective, Clapper speaks to many of the themes raised by earlier articles in the 
Issue, including the foreign policy drivers of FTO listing, the implications of the FTO 
list for peace negotiations, questions around the cohesion of terrorist groups, and the 
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